Dean Acheson’s Decisions Opened the Door for the Korean War

Dean Acheson’s Decisions Opened the Door for the Korean War

Acheson standing. Photo Credit: Tullio Saba

A major controversy during Dean Acheson’s time as Secretary of State was why South Korea was as undefended as it was when North Korea invaded. Many argue Dean Acheson’s decisions leading up to the outbreak was the reason South Korea was almost lost. His memoir surprisingly was very scant about the buildup to the Korean War and his reasoning for the actions he took during that buildup indicating implied agreement that he had the information to have deterred an invasion. Specifically the reports of undersupplying the South Korean military, the limiting of US military aid to South Korea, the assessments of both Korean forces, and his memoir support the claim Dean Acheson could have prevented the rout South Korean forces experienced at the outbreak of the war if not prevent the war from even occurring.

       

Dean Acheson’s memoir, Present at the Creation, covers a lot of events in specific detail including the Korean War. However, his memoir has very little information on the buildup to the Korean War and the actions (or lack of actions) Acheson made during that time period. The fact that such information is missing from his memoir can be interpreted as him having the information during the buildup that could have prevented the rout South Korea suffered at the beginning of the Korean War. Acheson does defend himself against the accusations that he was the cause for the initial defeat of South Korean forces and that he practically gave the Communists the green light to invade. However, his defense primarily focused on how his Press Club Speech about the Defense Perimeter in Asia was not the cause why South Korea was invaded and so unprepared. [1] He pointed out that Australia and New Zealand were not within the defense perimeter, but everyone knew the United States would defend those two countries and that countries knew the many defense agreements the United States had with South Korea. [2] He also noted that South Korea was very important and that the US “could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter.”[3]  However, he did explain why the United States recalled troops from the Korean peninsula. US troops left South Korea before the war in accordance with a United Nations resolution, that the Pentagon supported, that all US and Soviet troops were to leave Korea by the middle of 1949. [4] The larger issue is why did Acheson leave South Korea so vulnerable when it was such an important area to the US and he knew US troops had to leave the peninsula?

       

Acheson’s defense why he left South Korea vulnerable was because the exercises the US ran for danger spots of renewed Soviet aggression. He reported that Korea was deemed to not be high on the list because it was too closely located to major forces in Asia and was too close to US’ bases in Japan and the fact the Korean peninsula was too far from the USSR to make South Korea a tempting target.[5] Despite that, the US should had been ready for attack anywhere, especially in South Korea, which bordered North Korea, which bordered the USSR and China, all Communist countries.

       

Acheson’s memoir glossed over the fact South Korea’s military was undersupplied, given limited military aid by the US, and the unequal military advantage North Korea had over South Korea. He never explained in his memoir why that was the case although they are prominent in primary documents in the Department of State during the buildup to the Korean War that explain what he left out.

       

There is strong evidence that Dean Acheson left South Korean military forces undersupplied and under armed. Senator Taft himself understood this and publically said the US government was responsible for the trouble in the Korean peninsula by not arming South Korea enough against North Korean aggression. [6] Acheson’s recollection of losing a bill in Congress to send additional small amounts of aid to Korea in 1950 was the most blame he claimed in his memoir for under arming South Korea. [7] He never mentioned in his memoir about the reports he got about South Korea from US officials in Korea calling for more military supplies that South Korean forces extremely needed.

First, on February 10, 1950 the United States convinced the South Korean military to essentially disband its Youth Corps, Reserves Corps, and other irregular forces in order to lower the national defense budget to 4.37 billion won. [8] The US pressured South Korea to lower its military strength in this case doing much more than under-supplying or under arming them, but directly making them more vulnerable to North Korean aggression. The US military in South Korea informed the Department of State that the South Korean military had very limited military supplies and that there was a severe need for supplies and equipment. The advisers noted weapons and vehicles wore out quickly because they were being used by a large amount of soldiers. The advisers requested that supplies be sent as soon as possible. That report was submitted on April 20, 1950. [9] In a confidential communication from the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, Roberts, pointed out originally the South Korean army was to only be 50,000 strong. At that point in time it was enlarged to 100,000 strong, but that the Korean military did not have the needed in significant equipment to equip the soldiers. [10] Not only that, it was reported that up to 15% of the arms in the Korean military was un-usable as was up to 35% of the vehicles. [11] This report was sent on May 5, 1950. It was over two weeks after the previous report asking for equipment for South Korean soldiers. Yet the equipment had yet to arrive and it appeared the State Department had yet to ship those supplies to South Korea despite the request by the US military in South Korea.

       

Another example of Acheson’s inability or refusal to help supply the South Korean military exists in a number of correspondences from South Korea by US officials calling for more aircraft to be given to South Korea. In a message from the US Ambassador in South Korea to Dean Acheson it is noted that US military advisors claimed the need that “immediate measures must be taken to provide Korea with effective air means of countering the growing air threat from the North.” [12] If it was just one message and Acheson had sent the planes it would have shown his willingness to supply the Korean military. However, in the same report it was noted the US military advisors had already sent a message on September 21, 1949 and October 6, 1949 asking about planes for the South Korean air force with no reply. [13] The Korean Embassy also recommended in the same report that the South Korean air force be given planes in Japan the US were going to throw away. [14] Even by 1950 South Korea was vulnerable to North Korea’s air force. In a conversation by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Bond, it was noted that US officials in South Korea understood that South Korea had no defense against any possible attacks by air as well as sea. [15] Even a year later when it was first reported South Korea needed an air force it still had no air force. Dean Acheson had over a year to arm South Korea with an air force, but had not done so. It left South Korea vulnerable to North Korean attack.

       

One main reason why South Korea remained so undersupplied and under armed was the limited amount of military aid the United States supplied South Korea with. The United States actually lessened the amount of military aid South Korea got in the summer of 1949. Dean Acheson actually mentioned it in his memoir that a new bill was passed that lowered the amount of military aid given to its allies. [16] The most damning piece of evidence that Dean Acheson limited the amount of military aid the United States provided South Korea was when the Acting Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program asked for an increase of military aid to South Korea on May 10, 1950. [17] The director asked for an increase in military aid in order for South Korea to have a small air force, which it still lacked. However, nothing was done to increase the aid to give South Korea an air force prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. [18] Acheson’s failure in South Korea prior to the Korean War is evident just by the fact South Korea was not given an air force despite multiple requests for it from US officials in Korea starting from September 21, 1949 up to the start of the Korean War.

       

The South Korean military was underfunded and under-supplied, but that could have all been forgiven if North Korea had a similar predicate. However, North Korea was well funded and well supplied. Acheson had multiple reports about North Korean forces’ strength and capabilities and from those reports knew North Korea was militarily superior to South Korea. On May 11, 1950 Acheson was sent estimates of North Korea’s military power. It was estimated that North Korea had over 100,000 soldiers ready to fight along with a tank brigade of 65 tanks many with battle experience. [19] As previously stated South Korean forces only had 100,000 soldiers almost all without any battle experience. While South Korea had no air force and a small navy, North Korea had 70 airplanes and 32 ships. [20] Already Acheson knew there was a major difference in numbers and weaponry in favor of North Korea. By June 13, 1950 even Acheson admitted that North Korea’s military was stronger than South Korea’s and assessed that the North could successfully carry out operations against South Korea. [21]

       

The CIA on June 19, 1950 gave assessments of the Korean situation. The CIA asserted that the North Korean armed forces were superior because of their superiority in tanks, artillery, and aircraft. [22] The CIA even reported movement by North Korean forces towards the border between North and South Korea. On the border North Korean forces outnumbered South Korean forces. [23] In the report, North Korea’s goal was stated as “the elimination of the southern Republic of Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula under Communist domination.” [24] Therefore it was not surprising if North Korea resorted to an invasion to achieve its goals.

Although Acheson had this knowledge he continued to under-supply and under-fund South Korea’s military, not bridging the gap between South and North Korea’s forces that could have prevented the invasion committed by the North. The lack of an air force for South Korea is a constant theme in this paper. It links all three major themes together and highlights the sort of failures Acheson made leading up to the Korean War. South Korea desperately needed an air force as was noted by US officials in Korea. However, they lacked the funds and needed increased military aid from the US to give South Korea an air force. Acheson declined to increase military aid to create a South Korean air force. This sort of decision created the under armed South Korean military because Acheson did not provide the arms needed for South Korea to defend itself. He finally was provided intelligence that North Korea had air superiority over South Korea, but still refrained from shipping aircraft to South Korea. This led to the imbalance in military superiority between the two Koreas and gave the North Korean regime the confidence to invade and initially was extremely successful. It was a result of the decisions Acheson made leading up to the Korean War.

Dean Acheson’s memoir, Present at the Creation, carefully avoids discussion about Acheson’s decisions leading up to the Korean War. The little he does mention about his pre-Korean War choices, coupled with primary documents of the Department of State during that time period, support the belief that Acheson could have done better. He could have taken different actions, such as giving South Korea an air force, which would have prepared South Korean forces to fight North Korea, and possibly have even deterred North Korea from even invading.

Bibliography

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969.

“FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States.” University of Wisconsin Digital Collections. January 1, 2013. Accessed November 25, 2014.

http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS

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[1] Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 358.

[2] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 358.

[3] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 405.

[4] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 358.

[5] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 405.

[6] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 410.

[7] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 358.

[8] “FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States, Events Prior to Hostilities, January 1- June 24, 1950,” 26.

[9] “FRUS: Events Prior to Hostilities,” 47.

[10] “FRUS: Events Prior to Hostilities,” 93.

[11] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 93.

[12] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 34.

[13] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 34.

[14] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 34.

[15] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 79.

[16] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 310.

[17] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 82.

[18] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 83.

[19] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 84.

[20] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 85.

[21] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 104.

[22] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 110.

[23] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 119.

[24] “FRUS: Events Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities,” 120.